It has just appeared in the news that Chief Prosecutor of Hungary, Péter Polt is asking the European Parliament to suspend the immunity of MEP Péter Magyar in connection with the criminal proceedings initiated against him, to which the former orbánist patron responded by saying that he himself will request the suspension of his immunity if Orbán “joins” the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Now I don’t want to dwell on this political bullshit (I’ll look it up right now, but I don’t think I’ll find his supporting signature on the signature sheets of the referendum we initiated in 2015 on the subject of the EPPO…), let’s just stick to the legal part of the actual question.
Based on the current news, let’s state it right at the beginning: it doesn’t matter what the given member of the European Parliament asks for, wants or does not want in the given case, it doesn’t matter in the process. The European Parliament decides on the suspension of immunity, because that legal institution protects the Parliament, not the individual representative himself.
Although it is customary for the European Parliament to lift the immunity, thus “extraditin” the given MEP to the member states’ authorities in the case of common or “non-political” crimes, in the current situation, in my firm opinion, it should not do so. It is quite obvious that the hand-picked, loyal chief prosecutor of the regime is requesting the extradition of Péter Magyar because of a political mishap, and also because of a seemingly frivolous “accusation”, namely “theft”, which is abosultely a wrong legal classification of the act subject to the accusation. As I have recently described/said in several places before, for a mistake like this any second year law student is being flown straight to Kálvin square of Budapest (regardless of flying from the prestiguous Eötvös Loránd University or from the Pázmány University).
So, concluding:
- a hand-picked party figure, loyal chief prosecutor of the regime,
- on the basis of a frivolous accusation,
- for the political benefit of the regime.
This is a textbook example of a political case. And of course, you can talk about the guarantees offered by the independent courts. Well, I’m going to laugh even louder and more at this. Apart from my own personal experience with ridiculous kangaroo court proceedings against me, which I graciously set aside now, let me remind You: these are “independent” courts where the boss of the executor mafia negotiates with the head of the court about how to fire the judge he does not like for some reason (probably for trying to do his job properly). This conversation is being wiretapped and intercepted by the intelligence services (!), gets leaked out (!!!), and then nothing happens. (!!!) Where a decent judge, after initiating a preliminary decision with the European Court of Justice against the will of the government in a politically sensitive case (and the Court delivering a judgment, meaning agreeing with this judge), is being fired from her position and made subject of smear campaign by pro-government propaganda outlets. Where a significant part of the judges simply do not care about applicable EU laws or Strasbourg jurisprudence. And I could list more. Really, does anyone think that the Hungarian judiciary is independent? Well, as the country is subject to a conditionality procedure, obviously even the EU does not do that…
If the European Parliament seriously thinks that the justice system in Hungary is OK (which, by the way, it itself has questioned/refuted in recent years in all kinds of reports and so on, so we can see how serious those are), then it is even more stupid than what I usually unfortunately think.
Lattmann Tamás honlapja 