English – Lattmann Tamás honlapja

My position on Euronews on “unlocking Hungarian EU fines”

I was asked by Euronews about the possible Hungarian plans on getting rid of the financial punishment of historical size by the Court of Justice of the European Union some two years ago.

Seemingly, the orbanist shame still lives with Hungary. The current prime minister, Péter Magyar (once himself a minion of Viktor Orbán, settled in various, corruption-related well-paid positions) seems to carry on the fallen flag proudly: he has always said how great the migration policy of Viktor Orbán has been and that he does not intend to change it. At the same time, it is entertaining to see him try to make the past disappear, the question is, if the governments of the member states and the leadership of the EU is willing to play the same Ibsenic game, that the Hungarian electorate was.

But the real problem is this: the European Commission is not in the position of cancelling or erasing legal obligations established by the Court. And reagardless of what anybody thinks or wishes to think about possible political favours from Ursula von der Leyen towards Magyar,the Europan Parliament or any member state government can take the Commission to the Court for any unlawful or dubious political step. As You can read in the article, there are already voices raised against this.

The article with my opinion can be found here. (In Hungarian here…)

Practically the only chance of doing something with this fine (with a daily 1 million Euros added until that time), which means that Hungary does not have to actually pay AND the judgment of the Court remains intact, is the following: the Europan Commission plans an extra amount (which equals to the debt at that point of time) available to Hungary in the next MFF (“7 years budget”), and after it is adopted, withdraws that amount immediately as part of the offsetting procedure, mentioned by the spokesperson of the Commission in the video above. Seems easy? Well, if all member states do agree to it, then it will be easy. We will see how that will go.

Is rule of law in danger after Orbán’s fall?

I was asked by the Euronews about the claims of Viktor Orbán and his people stating that rule of law is in serious danger after the new government has taken over and started initiating various investigations against some earlier and current actions. These are still far from the investigations needed in relation for their systematic crimes during the 16-years governmental period, but their intense complaining my give You an idea about how worried they really are.

You can read the article here or watch the report here:

As I pointed out, at this point there is no need to cry wolf on the matter. At this point. It does not mean that this will stay forever like that. Until then let’s just enjoy the freshly found concern of Viktor Orbán’s people about rule of law, which they have simply denied for 16 years.

Concerns about the Hungarian electoral system

As the elections in Hungary are at the gates and seemingly there is an enormous interest towards that from foreign legal/political circles, I found it useful to publish a short overview and point out the most problematic elements. Mostly with the aim to correct some of the analytical mistakes made by many, thinking that the Hungarian elections are like “ordinary” elections like in any other countries, and the results are determined by political performance. Well, they are not.

Introduction

Following the adoption of Hungary’s new constitution (for a very early criticism by me, see here) and the new electoral system by Viktor Orbán’s one-party’s (Fidesz) two-third majority in the Parliament right after the 2010 landslide win, several features of the country’s political and electoral system have attracted significant attention within Europe. And while some aspects (e.g. taxation and rule‑of‑law issues) have widely and continuously been discussed ever since, the new electoral system often skipped attention, while it contains structural elements that are unusual – to say it nicely – within the EU or even among states all over the world. These features have raised concerns about fairness, proportionality, and the overall functioning of democratic competition.

Structure of the Hungarian electoral system

Hungary has always employed a mixed electoral system for parliamentary elections. The Hungarian Parliament (official name: National Assembly) consists of 200 seats (originally 386 in 2010 and the number reduction has also raised serious concerns as incumbent members’ chance of re-nomination by the governing Fidesz party were depending on the mercy of prime minister Viktor Orbán, turning them obedient puppets voting all of his proposals until the 2014 elections), allocated as follows: 106 seats are elected in single‑member electoral districts, while 93 seats allocated through national party lists. There is also a seat allocated to so-called “nationality members” based on pre-registration, currently there is one seat allocated to the German community. Fun fact: since 2018 it is taken by a member of Fidesz party, who had discovered his German identity after losing numerous elections running as Fidesz-candidate in the city of Budaörs (Wudersch).

This combination blends majoritarian and proportional elements. There is nothing unusual with this. However, the specific design of the system interacts with Hungary’s political landscape in ways that systematically advantage the governing party, that is the reason I tend to call it a “rigged electoral system”. It is important to emphasize that it is not “cheated”, and classic cheating, e.g. tinkering with the ballots is practically impossible with minimum attention paid by the competing parties.

Political Context

Hungary’s governing party alliance – the Fidesz party headed by prime minister Viktor Orbán and the Christian democrats with unmeasurable support – functions as one unified political force, even though it is formally composed of two parties. In contrast, the opposition is typically fragmented, often consisting of four to six parties competing simultaneously.

This asymmetry has significant consequences in single‑member districts, where the governing party presents a single candidate, while the opposition votes are divided among multiple candidates. As a result, a candidate from the governing party can easily win a district with a relatively low proportion – even with around 35% – if the opposition vote is split among several contenders.

Comparison with other electoral models

To understand the implications of Hungary’s system, it is useful to compare it with other electoral frameworks.

See the UK model for first, as government’s propagandists often use the argument that under that model Fidesz could have 90% of the seats in Parliament. The United Kingdom uses a first‑past‑the‑post system with single‑member districts. No compensation or anything for losing candidates: and as only one candidate wins per district, smaller parties rarely obtain seats, even if they receive substantial nationwide support. (This explains why smaller parties often struggle in parliamentary elections, despite having visible public support.)

Contrary to that, the European Parliament electoral model is totally different, as it uses proportional representation based on party lists. Voters select a party rather than an individual candidate, and seats are allocated proportionally. This system allows smaller parties to gain representation more easily. For example, politicians who fail to win seats in national district‑based elections (like smaller parties in the UK) may still enter the European Parliament through the list‑based voting.

Hungary’s somewhat hybrid electoral approach combines both systems: voters cast one ballot for a district candidate, and another for a national party list. This dual structure is not inherently problematic. Many democracies use mixed systems. However, the specific mechanisms Hungary employs – particularly regarding the so-called compensation – are highly unusual, and directly intended to favor the Fidesz party.

Compensation mechanisms in electoral systems

In mixed systems, compensation is typically used to ensure proportionality. The standard model is the so-called “loser compensation”, where votes cast for losing district candidates are added to their nominating party’s list totals. This prevents votes from being “wasted” and helps balance the final distribution of seats. The rationale behind loser compensation is to reduce disproportionality, ensure that parties receive representation roughly corresponding to their overall support, and prevent extreme distortions, which occur because of a purely majoritarian system (see the UK model above). Most European democracies with mixed systems use this approach.

The Hungarian “innovation”: the so-called winner compensation

Hungary – after 2010 – introduced a mechanism that is virtually unknown elsewhere: winner compensation. Under this system, not only the losing votes, but also the winning party’s surplus votes in district races are added to its national list totals. This means that if the governing party wins a district with, for example, 35% of the vote, the margin by which it wins is counted again on the party list. This amplifies the governing party’s advantage and contributes significantly to its repeated two‑thirds parliamentary majorities. Fidesz has won a 2/3 majority after the 2011 electoral reform not because of its great popularity and political brilliance, but because of this simple trick. (Winner compensation per se is not completely unknown in Europe, but it has never had such an effect on the distribution of seats. The Italian Constitutional Court in its 2017 Italicum ruling struck down as unconstitutional any excessive application of that. Funny, that right now the Italian prime minister seemingly tries to re-vitalize this solution: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/09/italys-electoral-law-is-giorgia-meloni-reshaping-the-system-to-secure-re-election )

Effects on electoral outcomes

Winner compensation does not involve fraud or manipulation of ballots. Votes are counted accurately. Instead, the design of the system itself produces disproportionate outcomes. As observers often note, the votes are genuine, but the translation of votes into seats is heavily skewed. This structural distortion explains why international election observers often find no procedural irregularities, even though the system consistently produces outcomes that strongly favor the governing Fidesz party.

The elimination of the two‑round system

Prior to the 2011 reforms, Hungary used a two‑round electoral system for district races, usually with a week between the two rounds. The first round allowed political parties to measure their political support, after which weaker opposition candidates could withdraw in favor of a stronger challenger. This mechanism encouraged strategic coordination and reduced vote fragmentation. Viktor Orbán know this system well: he has become prime minister in 1998 by making a last-minute deal with other parties after losing in the first round, and he nearly turned the election in 2002 after losing the first round again – but having run out of political allies by then. He knows the value of two-rounds: he made sure that nobody ever uses it any more.

The shift to a single‑round system eliminated the above mentioned opportunities. Without a second round, opposition parties cannot consolidate behind a single candidate, vote splitting persists, and the governing party benefits from being the only unified political force. Since the introduction of this system, opposition parties are doomed to engage in debates with each other, instead of focusing on the government. Parallel to this, raises in personal remuneration, all kind of bonuses to members of Parliament and state financial support to parties based on participation in the elections have made political parties highly interested in running, and practically they run against each other, not against the one-party government.

Since the 2014 elections, opposition parties have tried to break this system somehow. It is obvious that the determining point is the individual elections, so constant efforts were made to crate a ballot of 1 v. 1, Fidesz v. opposition. If that is successful, the “rigged” system becomes lethal to Fidesz, as the winner compensation easily may give constitutional majority to the opposition in the Parliament. There were political negotiations, even an “oppositional primary” in 2021, but these attempts were never successful – and voters have grown tired and impatient. The so-called “strategy of collaboration” seemingly failed, and as a result of this, the current elections give a chance to a brand new political party led by a former minion of Viktor Orbán, following the so-called “strategy of outgrowth”, which had been proposed by many analysts and strategists earlier, but none of the opposition parties had taken it earlier. So far, it has been successful in showing an alternative to opposition voters, now we will see how successful it is in the elections.

Conclusion

Hungary’s electoral system is a legally enacted but highly unusual configuration that combines a fragmented opposition, a single‑round district election (these two determining the winner), and a unique winner‑compensation mechanism (this one ensuring a constitutional majority to the winner). Together, these elements create a structural advantage for the governing party, enabling it to secure supermajorities without proportional levels of public support. While the system does not involve procedural fraud, its design raises significant constitutional and democratic concerns.

Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCAU)

New international criminal tribunals are relatively rarely born, so international lawyers are understandably happy about each new one. Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022 also heightened international political debates about aggression, thanks to which the theoretical basis for the establishment of a new international tribunal has now been created, and now we take a look at based on the available information.

The name of the court is the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCAU).

First question: why do we need a new tribunal when the International Criminal Court could apparently fulfill the task? Primarily because after the initial enthusiasm, it became obvious that that forum could not meet the political requirements. The “triumvirate” of genocide-war crimes-crimes against humanity seems to work fine, but there are very serious problems with the crime of aggression – and this is the most exciting topic for politics and its communication. The issue of aggression is not simple: after a decade after the adoption of the Statute, in 2010, a definition of the crime of aggression was finally hammered into it, but a significant number of state parties heve still not ratified it, and most countries do not even have a domestic legal definition of it, so it seemed easier for states to create a new ad hoc tribunal dealing only with this issue, and the rest can be left to the International Criminal Court.

What is already clear is that the definition included in the tribunal’s statute is based on previous definitional attempts and results of international law – we will return to this issue separately.

Second question: what kind of court will this be? Of the international criminal tribunal models so far, it corresponds to the so-called mixed or hybrid models, i.e. it combines international and domestic legal-institutional elements, and operates and is established with the participation of the state involved in some way. Compared to the “purely” international models, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the International Criminal Court (ICC), we have previously seen such cases in the cases of Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra Leone – SCSL) and Lebanon (Special Tribunal for Lebanon – STL), where the judicial bodies were established by agreement between the state concerned and the UN (with the consent of the Security Council).

In the current situation, the agreement was made between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, so this is the first time that the UN and especially the Security Council are left out of the picture. This could pose a serious legitimacy problem in international law, as the Security Council is the only body in the current international legal order where states recognize that it can take a position even in judging the actions of non-party states and reate legal obligations (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter). At the same time, it is obvious that the previous model would not have worked, as a probable Russian veto in the Security Council would not have allowed the institution to be established.

Third question: what are the operational features of the court? One of the most important is that the prosecutor’s office acts on the initiative of the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office, not independently. It has the option to “throw back” the request, so it is not an automatic servant, an extended arm of the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office, but based on this it seems much less independent than the prosecutor’s office of the International Criminal Court, or even that of the previous ad hoc tribunals.

It is too early to discuss many issues in more detail, as the court is not yet operational, but the process of its establishment is already at a point where it is worth taking it seriously. We’ll keep on watching…

Ukrainian-Russian summit in Budapest?

The possibility mentioned in the title has been mentioned more and more in the press, so it may be worthy to take a look into that. The fact is that for Viktor Orbán, it would mean a very serious diplomatic success from a political point of view, which can easily be converted into an excellent domestic political advantage with the next year’s Hungarian elections: look all, important things are happening and being decided here, organised by me, and in the event of successful negotiations, Budapest could literally write itself into the great books of diplomacy and history by achieving the Budapest Peace or Ceasefire (forget the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 now, please). This would be important for him not only from a foreign but also from a domestic political point of view, as he could use it to support his problematic foreign policy shifts and often incoherent steps of recent years.

Moreover, the biggest shame of the recent years, which I have also been constantly and intensely criticizing – the withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) – would become understandable here. Make no mistake, my position on the matter remains unchanged in principle, but the step, if still not moral, could become practically and politically defensible in the case of such a major diplomatic success. There is a good chance that the Russian president would not come to an EU member state that would be obliged to arrest him, but – Hungarian diplomacy and Viktor Orbán may reason – if the danger of that no longer exists, then there is no obstacle to the meeting on Hungarian territory. And that is why it may be worthy to accept the political-diplomatic inconveniences, especially since there were no particularly major disadvantages to be countered: the International Criminal Court ruled that Hungary had violated the provisions of the Rome Statue, the founding treaty of the ICC by not arresting Netanyahu, and did the only thing it could do, expressed its sorrow and pain to the Assembly of States Parties, where nothing happened – as usual. The European Union is also – for now – silent on the issue, apparently the EU institutions are not bothered enough by the violation of one of the very few common foreign policy values to do something, it’s not even impossible, that they partly share the Hungarian government’s plans and don’t want to get in the way of those. We don’t know this, it’s not important, the point is that they did not make this foreign policy step “more expensive”.

So, it may seem that this might even be possible. However, as always, the calculation may be wrong again.

As I said at the time, several times, in several places, leaving the International Criminal Court will not happen overnight. After the document on the withdrawal has been received by the UN Secretary-General, the ICC statute will still be binding on the state party for one more year, so its binding force will not cease until next summer, to be precise, June 2, 2026. However, the elections in Hungary next year will take place before that, so such a possible diplomatic success will not be useful there, and it is not worth expecting that the Russian side will put aside its worries, and certainly not that the Ukrainian side, striving for European integration, will take part in such a dog comedy. The painful reality is that Viktor Orbán is not worth it to anyone to deviate from his own safe path. However, if the Hungarian government is thinking in the longer term, this may still seem like a feasible solution for it (a meeting in Budapest in the fall of 2026), and although the practice so far does not fundamentally allow us to conclude this, it cannot be ruled out that it will be able to let go of thinking strictly in terms of election cycles in the field of foreign policy. This is not far from the political profile of Viktor Orbán in recent years, and if we assume that news related to the preparation of the meeting may also have political communication value, then such a solution is not unrealistic either.

Especially in light of the fact that one can essentially rejoin the International Criminal Court system at any time for free… At this point, I would refer to what the President of the Assembly of States Parties said when he commented on the withdrawal of Hungary: “I truly hope that Hungary’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute is not permanent, but just a brief pause to its commitment to international justice”. So the next question may be whether it is fortunate for states to abandon their “commitment to international justice” due to their current foreign policy interests. This is not just a theoretical-philosophical problem, as representatives of the Hungarian government have also continuously contrasted the values of “justice” and “peace” in their communication on the subject of the International Criminal Court, reflecting (even if unknowingly) on the possibility included in Article 16 of the Rome Statute (criticized by many from the beginning), according to which the UN Security Council can suspend any investigation or proceeding before the International Criminal Court at any time if it deems it necessary in the interests of maintaining international peace and security.

So the question, to which the future will provide the answer, is whether the Hungarian government only wanted to make such a quick turn, and whether we consider the possibility of such turns to be a good one at all.

Presentation at a conference by UNYP

We have had a short workshop/conference at UNYP in Prague. I held a presentation titled “Rotating presidency of the Council of the EU – a soft tool for hard times?”, in which I outlined my analyses on the nature of this unique political solution of the EU political system.

About the Chinese in the custody of the Ukrainians

The news, published by the Ukrainian media, that two Chinese citizens who had previously fought for Russian units had been taken prisoner of war, has understandably stirred up emotions. Additionally, it also raises a number of legal questions that are worth considering.

Is China becoming a belligerent?

If the Chinese citizens joined the Russian armed forces of their own free will – and based on our current knowledge, this is the case – then this does not make China a party to the ongoing conflict. If they had been sent by China, or if they were linked to China in some official capacity (e.g. being members of its armed forces), then their participation in the hostilities would certainly mean that China is also becoming a belligerent, although this is more of a political significance due to the distance between Ukraine and China.

Yes, it is possible that they did indeed go there of their own accord and joined the Russian armed forces, although the laws of most states prohibit citizens from undertaking military service for another state. However, the potential violation of this prohibition cannot be investigated by the enemy state involved in the conflict (in this case, Ukraine) in the event of their capture, since it has nothing to do with that citizen status, and is obliged to treat them in accordance with the rules dictated by the laws of war.

What rules apply to these individuals?

Since, as far as we know, they traveled to Russia of their own accord and joined its armed forces, their situation is equivalent to that of Russian soldiers – as long as they are members of the Russian armed forces, they are considered being prisoners of war and must be treated in accordance with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention III. From this perspective, it is irrelevant whether they joined voluntarily while staying on Russian territory or became Russian soldiers against their will as a result of some crazy local conscription; the important thing is the official connection with the state’s armed forces.

The same would be the case if they had been present in some kind of “representation” of China, only with the more complicated political background that – as I described above – in that case China would also be considered a belligerent party.

However, the situation would be significantly complicated if these Chinese citizens had not been captured in Ukraine as members of the Russian armed forces, but as private individuals, or as employees of a mercenary group or of a private military company – that is, without a direct state connection. In this case, they would not be entitled to the status of prisoner of war, which is usually reserved only for members of the armed forces of the states participating in the conflict by the system of laws of war. Such persons are considered being civilians in the armed conflict regardless of their actions, which can be actually really bad for them: on the one hand, their harmful actions, even if in accordance with the laws of war, become punishable (which is logically not the case with soldiers), and on the other hand, their detention is regulated not by the provisions of the abovementioned Geneva Convention III, but by Convention IV, related to civilians. Moreover, there is a chance that it does not apply to them either, since this convention (specifically its Article 4) states that it should not be applied to persons held in captivity who are not citizens of either party to the conflict and whose state has regular diplomatic relations with the capturing state. Since Ukraine and China have diplomatic relations, this situation would be a textbook example of this, but since the Chinese citizens served in the Russian armed forces, that relationship establishes the more regulated, stronger protected status of prisoner of war. The essence of this rarely invoked provision of Convention IV is to keep persons who are not involved in the conflict because of their nationality as far away from the conflict as possible, including the obligation to apply the rules of war. What if their own state does not want to do anything against the detaining power? Unfortunately, in such cases, only the human rights-related rules that apply to the detaining state impose some kind of limit on their treatment. The legal loophole and legal uncertainty that easily arise from this has allowed the United States to loosen the legal rules binding it with regard to the persons it captured during its “war on terrorism” after the 2001 September 11 attacks… But let’s not open that question here.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the interviewing of the Chinese prisoners, which constitutes a violation of the prohibition contained in Article 13 of the Geneva Convention III, governing the treatment of prisoners of war by Ukraine. This provision states that prisoners of war must be protected from “public curiosity”, which is obviously a provision intended to protect their person. It may of course be argued that they consented to the interviews, but the relevant practice typically does not accept this argument, and has not accepted it in other cases either. However, in this case too, the practical question arises: “so what then?”… It may be nothing, but it is worth noting the fact of the violation.

That is all we know for now, and that is all that is worth recording. If there are any developments, we will discuss it further.

Statement of Hungarian international lawyers against the blatant disregard for international law

Statement of Hungarian international lawyers against the blatant disregard for international law

Nie wywołuj wilka z lasu, Polska – on a possible exemption provided to Israeli politicians from the ICC

There are news going around the Polish government possibly granting immunity for official Israeli visitors from arrest and extradition to the ICC. Although the news is currently quite ambiguous (there has been no concrete announcement from Netanyahu about a visit to Poland), it is important to state that a state party to the Rome Statute cannot validly guarantee such immunities – the Statute contains the obligation to arrest and surrender without any exceptions.

Although the absurdity of the situation is indisputable – namely the idea that the Israeli Prime Minister arriving for the Auschwitz memorial service should face the risk of arrest – the ICC arrest warrant is not a political product, and accordingly, it does not take such aspects into account.

Poland, however, must take into account its existing obligations, and these are clear under the Statute.

Personally, I think that Netanyahu will not travel to Poland, what we are seeing now is nothing more than a “rumble” taking place in the Polish political communication space – the first to speak on the subject was President Duda, who has absolutely no problem putting Prime Minister Donald Tusk in a difficult position. The latter has to respond to this, while having to be very careful not to alienate his country from either the Western allies, the EU or the International Criminal Court itself, which has/will have an important role in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, itself as a kind of “ally”, with the arrest warrant issued against Putin.

Welcome to Schengen, Bulgaria and Romania!

Добре дошли в Шенген, България и Румъния!

Bun venit în Schengen, Bulgaria și România!

An earlier analysis of mine on the matter:

https://c4ep.eu/one-step-towards-the-european-balkans-a-partial-enlargement-of-the-schengen-area-with-romania-and-bulgaria/