English – Lattmann Tamás honlapja

Ukrainian-Russian summit in Budapest?

The possibility mentioned in the title has been mentioned more and more in the press, so it may be worthy to take a look into that. The fact is that for Viktor Orbán, it would mean a very serious diplomatic success from a political point of view, which can easily be converted into an excellent domestic political advantage with the next year’s Hungarian elections: look all, important things are happening and being decided here, organised by me, and in the event of successful negotiations, Budapest could literally write itself into the great books of diplomacy and history by achieving the Budapest Peace or Ceasefire (forget the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 now, please). This would be important for him not only from a foreign but also from a domestic political point of view, as he could use it to support his problematic foreign policy shifts and often incoherent steps of recent years.

Moreover, the biggest shame of the recent years, which I have also been constantly and intensely criticizing – the withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) – would become understandable here. Make no mistake, my position on the matter remains unchanged in principle, but the step, if still not moral, could become practically and politically defensible in the case of such a major diplomatic success. There is a good chance that the Russian president would not come to an EU member state that would be obliged to arrest him, but – Hungarian diplomacy and Viktor Orbán may reason – if the danger of that no longer exists, then there is no obstacle to the meeting on Hungarian territory. And that is why it may be worthy to accept the political-diplomatic inconveniences, especially since there were no particularly major disadvantages to be countered: the International Criminal Court ruled that Hungary had violated the provisions of the Rome Statue, the founding treaty of the ICC by not arresting Netanyahu, and did the only thing it could do, expressed its sorrow and pain to the Assembly of States Parties, where nothing happened – as usual. The European Union is also – for now – silent on the issue, apparently the EU institutions are not bothered enough by the violation of one of the very few common foreign policy values to do something, it’s not even impossible, that they partly share the Hungarian government’s plans and don’t want to get in the way of those. We don’t know this, it’s not important, the point is that they did not make this foreign policy step “more expensive”.

So, it may seem that this might even be possible. However, as always, the calculation may be wrong again.

As I said at the time, several times, in several places, leaving the International Criminal Court will not happen overnight. After the document on the withdrawal has been received by the UN Secretary-General, the ICC statute will still be binding on the state party for one more year, so its binding force will not cease until next summer, to be precise, June 2, 2026. However, the elections in Hungary next year will take place before that, so such a possible diplomatic success will not be useful there, and it is not worth expecting that the Russian side will put aside its worries, and certainly not that the Ukrainian side, striving for European integration, will take part in such a dog comedy. The painful reality is that Viktor Orbán is not worth it to anyone to deviate from his own safe path. However, if the Hungarian government is thinking in the longer term, this may still seem like a feasible solution for it (a meeting in Budapest in the fall of 2026), and although the practice so far does not fundamentally allow us to conclude this, it cannot be ruled out that it will be able to let go of thinking strictly in terms of election cycles in the field of foreign policy. This is not far from the political profile of Viktor Orbán in recent years, and if we assume that news related to the preparation of the meeting may also have political communication value, then such a solution is not unrealistic either.

Especially in light of the fact that one can essentially rejoin the International Criminal Court system at any time for free… At this point, I would refer to what the President of the Assembly of States Parties said when he commented on the withdrawal of Hungary: “I truly hope that Hungary’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute is not permanent, but just a brief pause to its commitment to international justice”. So the next question may be whether it is fortunate for states to abandon their “commitment to international justice” due to their current foreign policy interests. This is not just a theoretical-philosophical problem, as representatives of the Hungarian government have also continuously contrasted the values of “justice” and “peace” in their communication on the subject of the International Criminal Court, reflecting (even if unknowingly) on the possibility included in Article 16 of the Rome Statute (criticized by many from the beginning), according to which the UN Security Council can suspend any investigation or proceeding before the International Criminal Court at any time if it deems it necessary in the interests of maintaining international peace and security.

So the question, to which the future will provide the answer, is whether the Hungarian government only wanted to make such a quick turn, and whether we consider the possibility of such turns to be a good one at all.

About the Chinese in the custody of the Ukrainians

The news, published by the Ukrainian media, that two Chinese citizens who had previously fought for Russian units had been taken prisoner of war, has understandably stirred up emotions. Additionally, it also raises a number of legal questions that are worth considering.

Is China becoming a belligerent?

If the Chinese citizens joined the Russian armed forces of their own free will – and based on our current knowledge, this is the case – then this does not make China a party to the ongoing conflict. If they had been sent by China, or if they were linked to China in some official capacity (e.g. being members of its armed forces), then their participation in the hostilities would certainly mean that China is also becoming a belligerent, although this is more of a political significance due to the distance between Ukraine and China.

Yes, it is possible that they did indeed go there of their own accord and joined the Russian armed forces, although the laws of most states prohibit citizens from undertaking military service for another state. However, the potential violation of this prohibition cannot be investigated by the enemy state involved in the conflict (in this case, Ukraine) in the event of their capture, since it has nothing to do with that citizen status, and is obliged to treat them in accordance with the rules dictated by the laws of war.

What rules apply to these individuals?

Since, as far as we know, they traveled to Russia of their own accord and joined its armed forces, their situation is equivalent to that of Russian soldiers – as long as they are members of the Russian armed forces, they are considered being prisoners of war and must be treated in accordance with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention III. From this perspective, it is irrelevant whether they joined voluntarily while staying on Russian territory or became Russian soldiers against their will as a result of some crazy local conscription; the important thing is the official connection with the state’s armed forces.

The same would be the case if they had been present in some kind of “representation” of China, only with the more complicated political background that – as I described above – in that case China would also be considered a belligerent party.

However, the situation would be significantly complicated if these Chinese citizens had not been captured in Ukraine as members of the Russian armed forces, but as private individuals, or as employees of a mercenary group or of a private military company – that is, without a direct state connection. In this case, they would not be entitled to the status of prisoner of war, which is usually reserved only for members of the armed forces of the states participating in the conflict by the system of laws of war. Such persons are considered being civilians in the armed conflict regardless of their actions, which can be actually really bad for them: on the one hand, their harmful actions, even if in accordance with the laws of war, become punishable (which is logically not the case with soldiers), and on the other hand, their detention is regulated not by the provisions of the abovementioned Geneva Convention III, but by Convention IV, related to civilians. Moreover, there is a chance that it does not apply to them either, since this convention (specifically its Article 4) states that it should not be applied to persons held in captivity who are not citizens of either party to the conflict and whose state has regular diplomatic relations with the capturing state. Since Ukraine and China have diplomatic relations, this situation would be a textbook example of this, but since the Chinese citizens served in the Russian armed forces, that relationship establishes the more regulated, stronger protected status of prisoner of war. The essence of this rarely invoked provision of Convention IV is to keep persons who are not involved in the conflict because of their nationality as far away from the conflict as possible, including the obligation to apply the rules of war. What if their own state does not want to do anything against the detaining power? Unfortunately, in such cases, only the human rights-related rules that apply to the detaining state impose some kind of limit on their treatment. The legal loophole and legal uncertainty that easily arise from this has allowed the United States to loosen the legal rules binding it with regard to the persons it captured during its “war on terrorism” after the 2001 September 11 attacks… But let’s not open that question here.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the interviewing of the Chinese prisoners, which constitutes a violation of the prohibition contained in Article 13 of the Geneva Convention III, governing the treatment of prisoners of war by Ukraine. This provision states that prisoners of war must be protected from “public curiosity”, which is obviously a provision intended to protect their person. It may of course be argued that they consented to the interviews, but the relevant practice typically does not accept this argument, and has not accepted it in other cases either. However, in this case too, the practical question arises: “so what then?”… It may be nothing, but it is worth noting the fact of the violation.

That is all we know for now, and that is all that is worth recording. If there are any developments, we will discuss it further.

Statement of Hungarian international lawyers against the blatant disregard for international law

Statement of Hungarian international lawyers against the blatant disregard for international law

Nie wywołuj wilka z lasu, Polska – on a possible exemption provided to Israeli politicians from the ICC

There are news going around the Polish government possibly granting immunity for official Israeli visitors from arrest and extradition to the ICC. Although the news is currently quite ambiguous (there has been no concrete announcement from Netanyahu about a visit to Poland), it is important to state that a state party to the Rome Statute cannot validly guarantee such immunities – the Statute contains the obligation to arrest and surrender without any exceptions.

Although the absurdity of the situation is indisputable – namely the idea that the Israeli Prime Minister arriving for the Auschwitz memorial service should face the risk of arrest – the ICC arrest warrant is not a political product, and accordingly, it does not take such aspects into account.

Poland, however, must take into account its existing obligations, and these are clear under the Statute.

Personally, I think that Netanyahu will not travel to Poland, what we are seeing now is nothing more than a “rumble” taking place in the Polish political communication space – the first to speak on the subject was President Duda, who has absolutely no problem putting Prime Minister Donald Tusk in a difficult position. The latter has to respond to this, while having to be very careful not to alienate his country from either the Western allies, the EU or the International Criminal Court itself, which has/will have an important role in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, itself as a kind of “ally”, with the arrest warrant issued against Putin.

Welcome to Schengen, Bulgaria and Romania!

Добре дошли в Шенген, България и Румъния!

Bun venit în Schengen, Bulgaria și România!

An earlier analysis of mine on the matter:

https://c4ep.eu/one-step-towards-the-european-balkans-a-partial-enlargement-of-the-schengen-area-with-romania-and-bulgaria/

Clouds are gathering, preparing for the storm… then a light rain – evaluation of the 2024 Hungarian Council presidency

The Hungarian EU Council presidency had to face criticism and several challenges that promised quite a bumpy ride ahead. At some points even stripping Hungary from the presidency was considered as an option by some, but as we pointed out in an earlier analysis, this was not a realistic idea.

One of the biggest problems was around concerns about democratic values, as domestic policies of Hungary, particularly during the 13 years of Viktor Orbán’s government, were badly criticized for undermining EU principles such as media freedom, judicial independence, and the rule of law. These concerns persisted long before (and also throughout) the presidency and led to serious scepticism from some (member states, institutions and political actors) about Hungary’s possible leadership in guiding European policies and capacity of acting as an “honest broker” in European matters.

Critics also highlighted that the general lack of transparency in Hungary’s operation may “infect” the presidency, especially in its decision-making processes, particularly concerning politically sensitive topics like migration (being a leading domestic political-communication issue) and the expansion of the Schengen system (with the presence of specific Hungarian interests on the matter).

The problem of specific partisan interests also raised issues. Hungary was also accused of using its presidency to advance its national interests rather than the collective interests of the community of the EU. It was never hard to find potential crossroads here: the constant emphasis of the Hungarian government on migration policies and border security was seen by many as simply doing domestic politics rather than fostering a balanced EU-wide approach, but with an EU-sheet in the background. Existing polarized reactions to migration policy promised nothing good but required a good mediator, and while Hungary’s recent constant push for stricter migration controls aligned with some member states, it alienated others – leading towards a mess instead of coordinated action. Critics argued that the Hungarian government’s approach could exacerbate divisions within the EU rather than promote unity, especially in an era when implementation and execution of the new EU migration laws should be made a priority by all.

Additionally, serious geopolitical challenges were ahead as well. The Hungarian Council presidency had to navigate an unusually complex geopolitical landscape, including ongoing tensions related to the Ukraine war and the crisis in the Middle East. The Hungarian government’s close ties with Russia and perceived reluctance to fully support Ukraine raised questions about its impartiality in representing EU interests, instead of its own – even if, in many cases, those were not easy to be seen or to be understood. The same concerns have been present in Viktor Orbán’s one-sided support of Israel as well, which, according to critics, have oversimplified the situation, thus not being compatible with the interests or expectations of some member states intending to apply a more sophisticated approach to the crisis.

Preparing for the storm – the goals and priorities

By setting the goals and priorities, the Hungarian government tried to make sure those set for the second half of 2024 are in alignment with recognised pressing EU-wide challenges and not only its national interests. Its key focus included further expansion of the Schengen area and help in further EU enlargement. Migration and border management was of course an important issue, and the 2025 annual budget was something to be dealt with. Energy, competitiveness and sustainability have also been recognised as major issues.

The expansion of the Schengen area practically meant the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area (see an earlier analysis of ours on the subject). Hungary aimed to finalize agreements to end internal border controls for these countries, furthering EU cohesion and regional integration.

Concerning migration and border management we had more questions at the beginning than answers. The government of Hungary emphasized addressing illegal migration, strengthening external border controls, and reforming EU asylum policies, with the aims to enhance security and align migration policies with citizens’ expectations, but it was never clear, exactly what are the plans, especially shortly after finally concluding the long process of adoption of new laws on the subject (see our earlier analysis).

It is the job of the Council presidency to overlook the EU annual budget negotiations for the next year, where the priorities were to increase funding for cohesion policies, disaster relief, and Western Balkan enlargement preparations.

The latter was especially important: Hungary has already actively promoted the EU membership aspirations of Western Balkan countries, emphasizing their strategic importance and the need for faster accession processes. While some have seen this being more of an attempt of the Hungarian government to extend its local influence (and assist Russia’s geopolitical aims), this enlargement was in sync with the goals already identified by relevant European actors as well.

There was a lot of attention on energy security and competitiveness, especially because of the fact that during the past years, the Hungarian government – amid all the geopolitical tensions and the energy crisis – focused on trying to secure energy supplies differently than most of the other member states (again, raising serious debates sometimes), and it has done the same related to competitiveness. In the light of that, advancing discussions on a new European competitiveness pact to strengthen the economy of the EU seemed to be an interesting challenge.

Additionally, the presidency also emphasized the implementation of the European Green Deal, particularly in energy transition and environmental sustainability efforts, though this priority seemed to be secondary, compared to others, coming rather from the European Commission, and not solely from the Hungarian government.

Concluding the goals and priorities, they are the result of a balancing act by the Hungarian government between pressing EU challenges and its strategic national interests, including stricter control of migration and growth of regional influence.

Then a light rain – the results of the presidency

At the end, the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union can be viewed as relatively successful, as it was able to achieve several of its planned goals, while outmanoeuvring potential conflicts, sometimes by simply postponing them.

The presidency and Hungary itself have played a key role in advancing the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen Area – a long-standing goal of Hungary which was already made clear during its previous presidency, in the first half of 2011. A final agreement to lift all internal border checks is probable to be reached during this December, the current presidency, marking a significant step in European integration.

Under the Hungarian presidency’s leadership, the EU budget for 2025 was also successfully finalized. According to the priorities, the budget emphasized increased funding for cohesion, disaster relief, and support for Western Balkan countries pursuing EU membership. This was not easily achieved among all economic and geopolitical challenges, which required the presidency to negotiate effectively and to strike a balance between concurring interests.

The presidency also focused on strengthening EU migration policies, hammering out agreements on border security and asylum procedures, trying to align with public demand and the Hungarian government’s own interest in stricter controls. These measures were part of many actors’ broader efforts to maintain a European unity on delicate issues like migration, but we have to note here that efforts by the Hungarian presidency have not been focused on developing or deepening already existing policies, or a better implementation of those, but rather keeping a delicate balance between direct and long-term political interests, which is not easy to achieve. These problems and open questions will surely not go away with the Hungarian presidency.

Additionally, the presidency did not fall into all the traps that are provided by an opportunity like this. While it had a tough start with Viktor Orbán’s strange and fruitless “peace mission” global travels, raising eyebrows and facing significant criticism, the presidency was not used – or abused – by the Hungarian government to try to influence or even obstruct procedures related to Hungary. There were concerns e.g. related to the ongoing Article 7 procedure being tinkered with by the presidency, but it did not happen – slowly silencing the initially very loud criticism, letting these issues go to the upcoming Polish presidency.

Overall, we can conclude that the Hungarian Council presidency prioritized practical solutions to complex challenges in all relevant fields: EU enlargement, budgetary stability, and migration policy reform. While it faced criticism (both before and during its term) over domestic political concerns, its ability to achieve consensus on high-profile issues (even if by de-politicizing them) was well acknowledged.

Originally published on the C4EP website.

More than meets the eye – an infringement case at the court with a potential wider effect for the future

An infringement procedure against Hungary was launched nearly three years ago by the European Commission, and after lengthy negotiations without any results, it announced in July 2022 that it would refer its debate with Hungary to the Court of the European Union. 19 November has seen the hearing for the case, in front of a full court in session, with a high number of member states and the European Parliament as interveners in the case, representing their own opinion – which is fairly rare with infringement cases.

According to the position of the Commission, the contested Hungarian law (the so-called Child Protection Law) violates not only the provisions of more of the laws of the European Union (e.g. the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the E-Commerce Directive), but also various principles: the principle of freedom to provide services, or the right to data protection and certain notification obligations. The Brussels-based executive also argued that by violating the rights to human dignity, freedom of expression and information, private and family life and non-discrimination, the contested Hungarian law also violates the common values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) – those being respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

Not only a usual “Commission v. member state” debate

The wide interest with the case is demonstrated by the fact that after the Commission filing in the case to Court, an international campaign was launched to encourage member states to participate in this procedure, namely on the side of the European Commission – a very unusual idea related to infringement procedures, where member states usually are more interested in defending themselves against “Brussels”. As the result of this campaign, a total of sixteen member states (and the European Parliament) officially indicated their intention to participate in the proceeding as interveners, supporting the arguments of the Commission. Fourteen of these member states were also present at the Court hearing, and the vast majority of them also addressed the Court, just as the European Parliament did.

Who thinks what about who is right?

The essential part of the arguments is fairly easy to conclude: all the intervening states’ position were clear on agreeing that the European Commission is right and that adopted Hungarian law should be condemned, as it is in clear violation of the aforementioned EU laws, thus constitutes a violation of obligations deriving from the founding treaties.

However – and this easily becomes the really interesting thing about this case – as this is the first time that the European Commission has made the violation of the values under Article 2 TEU the subject of a major procedure, all the intervening states have addressed this subject intensely, with much more attention than the actual basic question of the case itself. And this may be important to emphasize because this is precisely the area in relation to which the Article 7 procedure is also underway currently against Hungary, and where the various procedures against member states may collide with each other.

Infringement procedure v. Art. 7 procedure?

One of the central elements of the Hungarian official argument is that the current judicial procedure creates a parallel with the procedure under Article 7 TEU. Neither the court, nor the intervening member states seemed to accept this argument, but they have made it clear in their contributions, that this is a realistic danger that they want to avoid. Hence, nearly all of them has drawn attention to the necessity of the violation of a specific legal obligation and to the proving of that so that an infringement could be based on that. It seems to be clear, that the European Commission was well prepared for this, since it also mentioned several exact EU pieces of legislation in its application and mentioned the violation of Article 2 as a supplementary problem to all of those. The member states present at the hearing seemed to want to reduce the future possibility of infringement proceedings being initiated solely on the basis of Article 2, therefore they argued intensely on a possible set of criteria to be fulfilled in future possible cases.

This is not only about some kind of self-defence, but also has a significance at a pan-European level, where the possibility of proceedings under Article 7 will actually be made impossible (and empty), if infringement proceedings will be possible to be initiated on the grounds of a breach of fundamental values embodied on Article 2 TEU. One question is, when the European Court of Justice will deliver a judgment in this case, will it cite Article 2 TEU as a reference point, or whether it will develop its case law on this later.

This way the case also has a strong political-constitutional dimension for the future, and it is not only whether the Orbán government of Hungary will lose a simple lawsuit. If the Court finds that Hungary has violated the fundamental values under Article 2 TEU, this would inevitably have an effect on the ongoing Article 7 procedure, which is currently clogged in its first stage in front of the Council (a fur-fifth majority of the member states is needed, but it has not been reached so far). A judgment like that would lead to a very strange situation: the Court would deliver a legally binding judicial decision on a question, which is currently subject to political consideration by the member states in the Council, seemingly unable to reach a compromise for four years now. It could provide strong confirmation and a basis for reference for member states critical towards the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán and may push those who are currently hesitant to take the procedure to a new stage.

How will the proceeding continue and what comes next

The next step in the court proceedings in this infringement proceeding will be the adoption of advocate general’s opinion, in which a preliminary legal position will be rendered to the Court. This is not binding on the Court in the case, but in almost all cases the subsequent judicial decision is in sync with that. The advocate general’s opinion is to be rendered during the next few months, and it is possible that the Court’s judgment will be rendered during the first half of 2025.

It is most likely that the Court will condemn the contested Hungarian legislation, but the interesting part will be what the Court will do with arguments based on the violation of Article 2 TEU – is that violation going to constitute an infringement by itself, or will the Court follow the more careful argument of the Commission’s application? In the first case, it will set a precedent with currently uncalculatable effect.

You can watch the broadcast of the hearing online here. The original post is available at the C4EP website.

The confirmation process of the European Commission – new analysis

My recent analysis titled “The confirmation process of the European Commission – power of the European populus via its electorate over „Brussels bureaucrats”?” is available on the C4EP website.

Read it here!

Additionally, me and my colleagues have started to make analyses on the candidates for the new European Commission paralel to the confirmation process. Find those as well there, if You are interested.

A choice not for, but affecting Europe – whom for POTUS, Harris or Trump?

My analysis on the possible implications of the result of the upcoming US presidential elections is published on the website of the Centre for European Progression (C4EP).

If You are interested, click here to read it!

On the possible suspension of Péter Magyar’s EP immunity

It has just appeared in the news that Chief Prosecutor of Hungary, Péter Polt is asking the European Parliament to suspend the immunity of MEP Péter Magyar in connection with the criminal proceedings initiated against him, to which the former orbánist patron responded by saying that he himself will request the suspension of his immunity if Orbán “joins” the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Now I don’t want to dwell on this political bullshit (I’ll look it up right now, but I don’t think I’ll find his supporting signature on the signature sheets of the referendum we initiated in 2015 on the subject of the EPPO…), let’s just stick to the legal part of the actual question.

Based on the current news, let’s state it right at the beginning: it doesn’t matter what the given member of the European Parliament asks for, wants or does not want in the given case, it doesn’t matter in the process. The European Parliament decides on the suspension of immunity, because that legal institution protects the Parliament, not the individual representative himself.

Although it is customary for the European Parliament to lift the immunity, thus “extraditin” the given MEP to the member states’ authorities in the case of common or “non-political” crimes, in the current situation, in my firm opinion, it should not do so. It is quite obvious that the hand-picked, loyal chief prosecutor of the regime is requesting the extradition of Péter Magyar because of a political mishap, and also because of a seemingly frivolous “accusation”, namely “theft”, which is abosultely a wrong legal classification of the act subject to the accusation. As I have recently described/said in several places before, for a mistake like this any second year law student is being flown straight to Kálvin square of Budapest (regardless of flying from the prestiguous Eötvös Loránd University or from the Pázmány University).

So, concluding:

a hand-picked party figure, loyal chief prosecutor of the regime,
on the basis of a frivolous accusation,
for the political benefit of the regime.

This is a textbook example of a political case. And of course, you can talk about the guarantees offered by the independent courts. Well, I’m going to laugh even louder and more at this. Apart from my own personal experience with ridiculous kangaroo court proceedings against me, which I graciously set aside now, let me remind You: these are “independent” courts where the boss of the executor mafia negotiates with the head of the court about how to fire the judge he does not like for some reason (probably for trying to do his job properly). This conversation is being wiretapped and intercepted by the intelligence services (!), gets leaked out (!!!), and then nothing happens. (!!!) Where a decent judge, after initiating a preliminary decision with the European Court of Justice against the will of the government in a politically sensitive case (and the Court delivering a judgment, meaning agreeing with this judge), is being fired from her position and made subject of smear campaign by pro-government propaganda outlets. Where a significant part of the judges simply do not care about applicable EU laws or Strasbourg jurisprudence. And I could list more. Really, does anyone think that the Hungarian judiciary is independent? Well, as the country is subject to a conditionality procedure, obviously even the EU does not do that…

If the European Parliament seriously thinks that the justice system in Hungary is OK (which, by the way, it itself has questioned/refuted in recent years in all kinds of reports and so on, so we can see how serious those are), then it is even more stupid than what I usually unfortunately think.