As the elections in Hungary are at the gates and seemingly there is an enormous interest towards that from foreign legal/political circles, I found it useful to publish a short overview and point out the most problematic elements. Mostly with the aim to correct some of the analytical mistakes made by many, thinking that the Hungarian elections are like “ordinary” elections like in any other countries, and the results are determined by political performance. Well, they are not.
Introduction
Following the adoption of Hungary’s new constitution (for a very early criticism by me, see here) and the new electoral system by Viktor Orbán’s one-party’s (Fidesz) two-third majority in the Parliament right after the 2010 landslide win, several features of the country’s political and electoral system have attracted significant attention within Europe. And while some aspects (e.g. taxation and rule‑of‑law issues) have widely and continuously been discussed ever since, the new electoral system often skipped attention, while it contains structural elements that are unusual – to say it nicely – within the EU or even among states all over the world. These features have raised concerns about fairness, proportionality, and the overall functioning of democratic competition.
Structure of the Hungarian electoral system
Hungary has always employed a mixed electoral system for parliamentary elections. The Hungarian Parliament (official name: National Assembly) consists of 200 seats (originally 386 in 2010 and the number reduction has also raised serious concerns as incumbent members’ chance of re-nomination by the governing Fidesz party were depending on the mercy of prime minister Viktor Orbán, turning them obedient puppets voting all of his proposals until the 2014 elections), allocated as follows: 106 seats are elected in single‑member electoral districts, while 93 seats allocated through national party lists. There is also a seat allocated to so-called “nationality members” based on pre-registration, currently there is one seat allocated to the German community. Fun fact: since 2018 it is taken by a member of Fidesz party, who had discovered his German identity after losing numerous elections running as Fidesz-candidate in the city of Budaörs (Wudersch).
This combination blends majoritarian and proportional elements. There is nothing unusual with this. However, the specific design of the system interacts with Hungary’s political landscape in ways that systematically advantage the governing party, that is the reason I tend to call it a “rigged electoral system”. It is important to emphasize that it is not “cheated”, and classic cheating, e.g. tinkering with the ballots is practically impossible with minimum attention paid by the competing parties.
Political Context
Hungary’s governing party alliance – the Fidesz party headed by prime minister Viktor Orbán and the Christian democrats with unmeasurable support – functions as one unified political force, even though it is formally composed of two parties. In contrast, the opposition is typically fragmented, often consisting of four to six parties competing simultaneously.
This asymmetry has significant consequences in single‑member districts, where the governing party presents a single candidate, while the opposition votes are divided among multiple candidates. As a result, a candidate from the governing party can easily win a district with a relatively low proportion – even with around 35% – if the opposition vote is split among several contenders.
Comparison with other electoral models
To understand the implications of Hungary’s system, it is useful to compare it with other electoral frameworks.
See the UK model for first, as government’s propagandists often use the argument that under that model Fidesz could have 90% of the seats in Parliament. The United Kingdom uses a first‑past‑the‑post system with single‑member districts. No compensation or anything for losing candidates: and as only one candidate wins per district, smaller parties rarely obtain seats, even if they receive substantial nationwide support. (This explains why smaller parties often struggle in parliamentary elections, despite having visible public support.)
Contrary to that, the European Parliament electoral model is totally different, as it uses proportional representation based on party lists. Voters select a party rather than an individual candidate, and seats are allocated proportionally. This system allows smaller parties to gain representation more easily. For example, politicians who fail to win seats in national district‑based elections (like smaller parties in the UK) may still enter the European Parliament through the list‑based voting.
Hungary’s somewhat hybrid electoral approach combines both systems: voters cast one ballot for a district candidate, and another for a national party list. This dual structure is not inherently problematic. Many democracies use mixed systems. However, the specific mechanisms Hungary employs – particularly regarding the so-called compensation – are highly unusual, and directly intended to favor the Fidesz party.
Compensation mechanisms in electoral systems
In mixed systems, compensation is typically used to ensure proportionality. The standard model is the so-called “loser compensation”, where votes cast for losing district candidates are added to their nominating party’s list totals. This prevents votes from being “wasted” and helps balance the final distribution of seats. The rationale behind loser compensation is to reduce disproportionality, ensure that parties receive representation roughly corresponding to their overall support, and prevent extreme distortions, which occur because of a purely majoritarian system (see the UK model above). Most European democracies with mixed systems use this approach.
The Hungarian “innovation”: the so-called winner compensation
Hungary – after 2010 – introduced a mechanism that is virtually unknown elsewhere: winner compensation. Under this system, not only the losing votes, but also the winning party’s surplus votes in district races are added to its national list totals. This means that if the governing party wins a district with, for example, 35% of the vote, the margin by which it wins is counted again on the party list. This amplifies the governing party’s advantage and contributes significantly to its repeated two‑thirds parliamentary majorities. Fidesz has won a 2/3 majority after the 2011 electoral reform not because of its great popularity and political brilliance, but because of this simple trick. (Winner compensation per se is not completely unknown in Europe, but it has never had such an effect on the distribution of seats. The Italian Constitutional Court in its 2017 Italicum ruling struck down as unconstitutional any excessive application of that. Funny, that right now the Italian prime minister seemingly tries to re-vitalize this solution: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/09/italys-electoral-law-is-giorgia-meloni-reshaping-the-system-to-secure-re-election )
Effects on electoral outcomes
Winner compensation does not involve fraud or manipulation of ballots. Votes are counted accurately. Instead, the design of the system itself produces disproportionate outcomes. As observers often note, the votes are genuine, but the translation of votes into seats is heavily skewed. This structural distortion explains why international election observers often find no procedural irregularities, even though the system consistently produces outcomes that strongly favor the governing Fidesz party.
The elimination of the two‑round system
Prior to the 2011 reforms, Hungary used a two‑round electoral system for district races, usually with a week between the two rounds. The first round allowed political parties to measure their political support, after which weaker opposition candidates could withdraw in favor of a stronger challenger. This mechanism encouraged strategic coordination and reduced vote fragmentation. Viktor Orbán know this system well: he has become prime minister in 1998 by making a last-minute deal with other parties after losing in the first round, and he nearly turned the election in 2002 after losing the first round again – but having run out of political allies by then. He knows the value of two-rounds: he made sure that nobody ever uses it any more.
The shift to a single‑round system eliminated the above mentioned opportunities. Without a second round, opposition parties cannot consolidate behind a single candidate, vote splitting persists, and the governing party benefits from being the only unified political force. Since the introduction of this system, opposition parties are doomed to engage in debates with each other, instead of focusing on the government. Parallel to this, raises in personal remuneration, all kind of bonuses to members of Parliament and state financial support to parties based on participation in the elections have made political parties highly interested in running, and practically they run against each other, not against the one-party government.
Since the 2014 elections, opposition parties have tried to break this system somehow. It is obvious that the determining point is the individual elections, so constant efforts were made to crate a ballot of 1 v. 1, Fidesz v. opposition. If that is successful, the “rigged” system becomes lethal to Fidesz, as the winner compensation easily may give constitutional majority to the opposition in the Parliament. There were political negotiations, even an “oppositional primary” in 2021, but these attempts were never successful – and voters have grown tired and impatient. The so-called “strategy of collaboration” seemingly failed, and as a result of this, the current elections give a chance to a brand new political party led by a former minion of Viktor Orbán, following the so-called “strategy of outgrowth”, which had been proposed by many analysts and strategists earlier, but none of the opposition parties had taken it earlier. So far, it has been successful in showing an alternative to opposition voters, now we will see how successful it is in the elections.
Conclusion
Hungary’s electoral system is a legally enacted but highly unusual configuration that combines a fragmented opposition, a single‑round district election (these two determining the winner), and a unique winner‑compensation mechanism (this one ensuring a constitutional majority to the winner). Together, these elements create a structural advantage for the governing party, enabling it to secure supermajorities without proportional levels of public support. While the system does not involve procedural fraud, its design raises significant constitutional and democratic concerns.
Lattmann Tamás honlapja 