Read my latest analysis on the C4EP website:
Kategória: European Union
“European Elections through Young Eyes” – C4EP event yesterday in Brussels
Even though we had a rocky start with our first C4EP event this fall – I managed to catch a bad cold, while I was assigned to be the moderator of the event, one of our speakers indicated that he might be late because of work, and another one cancelling just before the event because of urgent obligations related to the upcoming EU Summit – we are pleased with how our „European Elections through Young Eyes” event turned out.
We have addressed many topics from the participation of youth in the elections through the Spitzenkandidaten process, even to the „F” word, dreaded all around the EU bubble of Brussels (in this case: the federalisation of the European Union).
It was great to cooperate with our invited speakers, Krisztina and Ivan from the European Parliament, but also our audience for being with us yesterday and staying with us after the event for a cool chat with some wine. We hope that You will join us in our next events, too! Additionally, we are grateful to Press Club Brussels to make sure that everything was working without an itch. We will be back!
A detailed report on the event will follow on the C4EP website, until then You can find some more photos on its Instagram and Facebook profiles!
The one to call if You want to talk to Europe? – the President of the European Commission
Read my current C4EP analysis on the current state of the position, partly using the current “State of the European Union” address and also make an educated guess on the future of the position with or without the current President, Ursula von der Leyen.
It is also to be published in the next C4EPIECE Newsletter during this week.
Check it out here:
Some thoughts about the plans of the president of the European Council…
Charles Michel, the president of the European Council has addressed the participants of the prestigious Bled Strategic Forum. He is responsible for close cooperation with heads of states and governments of the EU member states, thus his ideas are worthy of attention as those presumably well-founded and formulated while understanding the positions of these leaders and their respective states.
I have prepared a short analysis of his speech to the C4EP Website (later to be included in its C4EPIECE Newsletter), trying to draw conclusions about the reality of those ideas and the possibility of implementing those during the time left of Michel’s term, ending in 2025.
Read it here!
Veto power – not the tool we love, but the tool we need?
The issue of the veto power has recently come to the forefront of attention and debate both on global and European level. This usually happens when current political events draw attention to something. Today this is related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine (reviving the debate earlier related to other issues): among the debates within the European Union, its operation and future, the question of the right of veto belonging to individual member states had already featured prominently in the decision-making process of the EU, but the need for unanimity with regard to sanctions against Russia gives it a special relevance.
I have prepared an analysis on the subject to the C4EP website, later to be included in its C4EPIECE Newsletter.
Read it here!
C4EPIECE 1/2023
The first edition of the newsletter of the Centre for European Progression titled C4EPIECE is out now. The focus of the current edition is the struggle over the presidency of the Council of the European Union, but we bring You other important subjects as well from member states and the global theater.
You can read it here.
Register on the C4EP website to receive it directly every time a new edition being published!
Let me help You understand what an “infringement procedure” in the EU practically means
According to the founding treaties of the EU, the European Commission may take action against an EU member state that fails to implement EU law or violates its obligations under EU membership in any form. It is possible that the Commission refers the case to the European Court of Justice, which may impose financial sanctions in case of non-compliance of the member state.
Read more here: https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-…
A few words to Euronews about the EP corruption scandle
Today the Brussels-based Euronews has asked my opinion about some of the legal questions related to the ongoing corruption scandle in the European Parliament. Their report can be found here, but You can be sure that the story is far from being closed.
The legal situation is not that simple, as neither the European Parliament nor the European Union in general has any kind of set of legal rules applicable to situations like these. Therefore, the local Belgian authorities have conducted investigations related to a crime that allegedly was targeted against the EU or one of its institutions, based on classical territorial jurisdiction, as the crime was committed in Belgium. As the European Parliament was quick to offer its full cooperation, including lifting the immunity of the MEPs involved, seemingly more serious legal-political complications will be avoided.
But the situation may not always be that simple. The famous – at least for Hungarians – case of “KGBéla” (a former MEP from the extreme-right wing party Jobbik, who was allegedly cooperating with the Russian intelligence) has opened up a question, for which I still have not found the proper answer – even if I may be the only person interested in that. This question is, if a member state is allowed to create a crime in its own legal system (see the crime of “Espionage against the institutions of the European Union” added into section 261/A of the Hungarian Criminal Code at that time) without any Union-level legal provision and any demand or request for that from the EU or its institutions. Can a member state “protect” EU institutions with its own domestic penal legislative measures? I will definitely come back to this at a later point.
Anyway, I think that to avoid these kind of problems in the future, the European Union shall turn its attention to try to settle this question.
The EU’s new “rule of law” regulation after the AG’s opinion and some of its Hungarian aspects
In recent days, events around the EU’s new rule of law instrument seem to have accelerated, following the publication of the Advocate General’s Opinion of the European Court in the annulment proceedings brought by the Polish and Hungarian governments. This did not, in essence, brought any surprise, the AG has found all the arguments of these governments as essentially unfounded.
These are understandably summarized in the opinion, so I would not go into them in detail here. At the same time, it is necessary to draw attention again to the fact that the new mechanism is informally called a “rule of law” procedure, in fact it is a control-sanctioning tool for the protection of the EU budget, EU public funds, as even the title of an early 2019 shorter study of mine on the subject has shown it: “Better protection of the rule of law – or of European taxpayers’ money” Linking the mechanism to EU budget was necessary for more reasons: 1) to create the link to EU competence, 2) to distance the new mechanism from Article 7 procedure, often criticized for its ineffective and political nature.
If the court reaches the same conclusion as the Advocate General (as in most cases) this means that the regulation adopted last year, which entered into force on 1 January 2021, will not be annulled by the court. As a result, all obstacles will be removed from the European Commission to take already well-visible formal steps in this procedure towards Hungary. So far, only one communication has been made public, which is obviously the first step in such a procedure anyway. When is this expected? I think the court’s verdict is expected in February at the earliest, so the proceedings will end roughly in a way that the 2022 Hungarian elections are unlikely to be affected by it. Contrary to the hopes of many, and sadly to the rampant corruption situation within the country, the campaign period will not see vast amounts of support money withdrawn by the EU yet. Obviously one of the most important strategic goals of the Orbán-led government was to avoid this anyway, that is why Viktor Orbán has threatened with the use of the veto during the 2020 negotiations of the MFF, cleverly using the immense political mistake of linking the adoption of MFF and the legislative process of the regulation creating this proceeding, initiated in 2018.
This is shown by reviewing the rules of the procedure itself. It is not particularly complicated: if the European Commission encounters a rule of law-related problem in the management of EU funds (detailed by the regulation itself), it can propose to the Council to adopt certain measures, including withholding of funds. This is one of the most significant changes from the original proposal of 2018, according to which, in essence, the Commission itself could have taken these measures (with the presumption of adoption by the Council), now it requires a separate decision.
Before making its proposal to the Council, the Commission must formally notify the Member State concerned, giving it at least one month to submit its position, additionally it also has to inform the European Parliament and the Council itself. Of course, some time already passes before this, as informal communications, collection of information etc. must take place, as the current Hungarian situation shows, requesting information and other communication is possible even before the formal notification. In the case of the Member State concerned fails to comply with the problems identified by the formal notification, the Commission may propose various measures, which it shall also communicate to the Member State concerned, allowing again at least one month to react to it. After that it sends its proposal to the Council, which has a period of one, exceptionally two months to adopt the proper decision, and if it wants to change it, it can do so by a qualified majority.
From this it is logical, that even if we optimistically expect the Court’s judgment to come in February, and that the Commission and the Council will act immediately, it will still take at least three-four months until the needed decision is adopted, which is already slipping out of the election campaign period of the 2022 elections.
The most unfortunate fact is, that if the elections bring a change in the Hungarian government, the new government will get all the trouble coming with this mechanism – well, at least You can be sure that there will be a serious political ambition to get things right with rule of law in Hungary. Based on communications of the opposition, it seems clear that they are ready to implement serious steps to handle these issues, e.g. there is seemingly a strong commitment to join the EPPO – which I am sure that the Constitutional Court (filled up with hand-picked orbanist jurists) will do its best to try to block, but this is a battle for that time…
Post-truth, alternative “facts” by the Hungarian minister of justice
After the judgment finally rendered by the European Court of Justice on the infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission against Hungary for adoption of the so-called “NGO Transparency Law”, finding it actually being in violation of EU law, the minister of justice has immediately reacted with some strange “explanation”, seemingly arguing it is an actual win for the government.
According to Judit Varga, the court has actually confirmed the position of the Hungarian government, as “the goal of ensuring transparency of NGOs, being the goal of the legislation related to organisations supported from abroad is legitimate, which is confirmed by the judgment of the Court”. She later has posted a ridiculous post on her Facebook page accusing an oppositional MEP and a newsportal with “not being able to interpret a press release correctly”.
Maybe because instead of a “press release”, they were using the actual text of the judgment:
Hungary has introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations to civil society organisations, in breach of its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter.
Para 143 of the judgment
No wonder that these “arguments” are only available in Hungarian. It is time to understand who and what level of political shamelessness all the European political partners have to face when it comes to the actual Hungarian government – at least if they have any intentions to understand it.
Lattmann Tamás honlapja 