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Clouds are gathering, preparing for the storm… then a light rain – evaluation of the 2024 Hungarian Council presidency

The Hungarian EU Council presidency had to face criticism and several challenges that promised quite a bumpy ride ahead. At some points even stripping Hungary from the presidency was considered as an option by some, but as we pointed out in an earlier analysis, this was not a realistic idea.

One of the biggest problems was around concerns about democratic values, as domestic policies of Hungary, particularly during the 13 years of Viktor Orbán’s government, were badly criticized for undermining EU principles such as media freedom, judicial independence, and the rule of law. These concerns persisted long before (and also throughout) the presidency and led to serious scepticism from some (member states, institutions and political actors) about Hungary’s possible leadership in guiding European policies and capacity of acting as an “honest broker” in European matters.

Critics also highlighted that the general lack of transparency in Hungary’s operation may “infect” the presidency, especially in its decision-making processes, particularly concerning politically sensitive topics like migration (being a leading domestic political-communication issue) and the expansion of the Schengen system (with the presence of specific Hungarian interests on the matter).

The problem of specific partisan interests also raised issues. Hungary was also accused of using its presidency to advance its national interests rather than the collective interests of the community of the EU. It was never hard to find potential crossroads here: the constant emphasis of the Hungarian government on migration policies and border security was seen by many as simply doing domestic politics rather than fostering a balanced EU-wide approach, but with an EU-sheet in the background. Existing polarized reactions to migration policy promised nothing good but required a good mediator, and while Hungary’s recent constant push for stricter migration controls aligned with some member states, it alienated others – leading towards a mess instead of coordinated action. Critics argued that the Hungarian government’s approach could exacerbate divisions within the EU rather than promote unity, especially in an era when implementation and execution of the new EU migration laws should be made a priority by all.

Additionally, serious geopolitical challenges were ahead as well. The Hungarian Council presidency had to navigate an unusually complex geopolitical landscape, including ongoing tensions related to the Ukraine war and the crisis in the Middle East. The Hungarian government’s close ties with Russia and perceived reluctance to fully support Ukraine raised questions about its impartiality in representing EU interests, instead of its own – even if, in many cases, those were not easy to be seen or to be understood. The same concerns have been present in Viktor Orbán’s one-sided support of Israel as well, which, according to critics, have oversimplified the situation, thus not being compatible with the interests or expectations of some member states intending to apply a more sophisticated approach to the crisis.

Preparing for the storm – the goals and priorities

By setting the goals and priorities, the Hungarian government tried to make sure those set for the second half of 2024 are in alignment with recognised pressing EU-wide challenges and not only its national interests. Its key focus included further expansion of the Schengen area and help in further EU enlargement. Migration and border management was of course an important issue, and the 2025 annual budget was something to be dealt with. Energy, competitiveness and sustainability have also been recognised as major issues.

The expansion of the Schengen area practically meant the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area (see an earlier analysis of ours on the subject). Hungary aimed to finalize agreements to end internal border controls for these countries, furthering EU cohesion and regional integration.

Concerning migration and border management we had more questions at the beginning than answers. The government of Hungary emphasized addressing illegal migration, strengthening external border controls, and reforming EU asylum policies, with the aims to enhance security and align migration policies with citizens’ expectations, but it was never clear, exactly what are the plans, especially shortly after finally concluding the long process of adoption of new laws on the subject (see our earlier analysis).

It is the job of the Council presidency to overlook the EU annual budget negotiations for the next year, where the priorities were to increase funding for cohesion policies, disaster relief, and Western Balkan enlargement preparations.

The latter was especially important: Hungary has already actively promoted the EU membership aspirations of Western Balkan countries, emphasizing their strategic importance and the need for faster accession processes. While some have seen this being more of an attempt of the Hungarian government to extend its local influence (and assist Russia’s geopolitical aims), this enlargement was in sync with the goals already identified by relevant European actors as well.

There was a lot of attention on energy security and competitiveness, especially because of the fact that during the past years, the Hungarian government – amid all the geopolitical tensions and the energy crisis – focused on trying to secure energy supplies differently than most of the other member states (again, raising serious debates sometimes), and it has done the same related to competitiveness. In the light of that, advancing discussions on a new European competitiveness pact to strengthen the economy of the EU seemed to be an interesting challenge.

Additionally, the presidency also emphasized the implementation of the European Green Deal, particularly in energy transition and environmental sustainability efforts, though this priority seemed to be secondary, compared to others, coming rather from the European Commission, and not solely from the Hungarian government.

Concluding the goals and priorities, they are the result of a balancing act by the Hungarian government between pressing EU challenges and its strategic national interests, including stricter control of migration and growth of regional influence.

Then a light rain – the results of the presidency

At the end, the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union can be viewed as relatively successful, as it was able to achieve several of its planned goals, while outmanoeuvring potential conflicts, sometimes by simply postponing them.

The presidency and Hungary itself have played a key role in advancing the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen Area – a long-standing goal of Hungary which was already made clear during its previous presidency, in the first half of 2011. A final agreement to lift all internal border checks is probable to be reached during this December, the current presidency, marking a significant step in European integration.

Under the Hungarian presidency’s leadership, the EU budget for 2025 was also successfully finalized. According to the priorities, the budget emphasized increased funding for cohesion, disaster relief, and support for Western Balkan countries pursuing EU membership. This was not easily achieved among all economic and geopolitical challenges, which required the presidency to negotiate effectively and to strike a balance between concurring interests.

The presidency also focused on strengthening EU migration policies, hammering out agreements on border security and asylum procedures, trying to align with public demand and the Hungarian government’s own interest in stricter controls. These measures were part of many actors’ broader efforts to maintain a European unity on delicate issues like migration, but we have to note here that efforts by the Hungarian presidency have not been focused on developing or deepening already existing policies, or a better implementation of those, but rather keeping a delicate balance between direct and long-term political interests, which is not easy to achieve. These problems and open questions will surely not go away with the Hungarian presidency.

Additionally, the presidency did not fall into all the traps that are provided by an opportunity like this. While it had a tough start with Viktor Orbán’s strange and fruitless “peace mission” global travels, raising eyebrows and facing significant criticism, the presidency was not used – or abused – by the Hungarian government to try to influence or even obstruct procedures related to Hungary. There were concerns e.g. related to the ongoing Article 7 procedure being tinkered with by the presidency, but it did not happen – slowly silencing the initially very loud criticism, letting these issues go to the upcoming Polish presidency.

Overall, we can conclude that the Hungarian Council presidency prioritized practical solutions to complex challenges in all relevant fields: EU enlargement, budgetary stability, and migration policy reform. While it faced criticism (both before and during its term) over domestic political concerns, its ability to achieve consensus on high-profile issues (even if by de-politicizing them) was well acknowledged.

Originally published on the C4EP website.

More than meets the eye – an infringement case at the court with a potential wider effect for the future

An infringement procedure against Hungary was launched nearly three years ago by the European Commission, and after lengthy negotiations without any results, it announced in July 2022 that it would refer its debate with Hungary to the Court of the European Union. 19 November has seen the hearing for the case, in front of a full court in session, with a high number of member states and the European Parliament as interveners in the case, representing their own opinion – which is fairly rare with infringement cases.

According to the position of the Commission, the contested Hungarian law (the so-called Child Protection Law) violates not only the provisions of more of the laws of the European Union (e.g. the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the E-Commerce Directive), but also various principles: the principle of freedom to provide services, or the right to data protection and certain notification obligations. The Brussels-based executive also argued that by violating the rights to human dignity, freedom of expression and information, private and family life and non-discrimination, the contested Hungarian law also violates the common values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) – those being respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

Not only a usual “Commission v. member state” debate

The wide interest with the case is demonstrated by the fact that after the Commission filing in the case to Court, an international campaign was launched to encourage member states to participate in this procedure, namely on the side of the European Commission – a very unusual idea related to infringement procedures, where member states usually are more interested in defending themselves against “Brussels”. As the result of this campaign, a total of sixteen member states (and the European Parliament) officially indicated their intention to participate in the proceeding as interveners, supporting the arguments of the Commission. Fourteen of these member states were also present at the Court hearing, and the vast majority of them also addressed the Court, just as the European Parliament did.

Who thinks what about who is right?

The essential part of the arguments is fairly easy to conclude: all the intervening states’ position were clear on agreeing that the European Commission is right and that adopted Hungarian law should be condemned, as it is in clear violation of the aforementioned EU laws, thus constitutes a violation of obligations deriving from the founding treaties.

However – and this easily becomes the really interesting thing about this case – as this is the first time that the European Commission has made the violation of the values under Article 2 TEU the subject of a major procedure, all the intervening states have addressed this subject intensely, with much more attention than the actual basic question of the case itself. And this may be important to emphasize because this is precisely the area in relation to which the Article 7 procedure is also underway currently against Hungary, and where the various procedures against member states may collide with each other.

Infringement procedure v. Art. 7 procedure?

One of the central elements of the Hungarian official argument is that the current judicial procedure creates a parallel with the procedure under Article 7 TEU. Neither the court, nor the intervening member states seemed to accept this argument, but they have made it clear in their contributions, that this is a realistic danger that they want to avoid. Hence, nearly all of them has drawn attention to the necessity of the violation of a specific legal obligation and to the proving of that so that an infringement could be based on that. It seems to be clear, that the European Commission was well prepared for this, since it also mentioned several exact EU pieces of legislation in its application and mentioned the violation of Article 2 as a supplementary problem to all of those. The member states present at the hearing seemed to want to reduce the future possibility of infringement proceedings being initiated solely on the basis of Article 2, therefore they argued intensely on a possible set of criteria to be fulfilled in future possible cases.

This is not only about some kind of self-defence, but also has a significance at a pan-European level, where the possibility of proceedings under Article 7 will actually be made impossible (and empty), if infringement proceedings will be possible to be initiated on the grounds of a breach of fundamental values embodied on Article 2 TEU. One question is, when the European Court of Justice will deliver a judgment in this case, will it cite Article 2 TEU as a reference point, or whether it will develop its case law on this later.

This way the case also has a strong political-constitutional dimension for the future, and it is not only whether the Orbán government of Hungary will lose a simple lawsuit. If the Court finds that Hungary has violated the fundamental values under Article 2 TEU, this would inevitably have an effect on the ongoing Article 7 procedure, which is currently clogged in its first stage in front of the Council (a fur-fifth majority of the member states is needed, but it has not been reached so far). A judgment like that would lead to a very strange situation: the Court would deliver a legally binding judicial decision on a question, which is currently subject to political consideration by the member states in the Council, seemingly unable to reach a compromise for four years now. It could provide strong confirmation and a basis for reference for member states critical towards the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán and may push those who are currently hesitant to take the procedure to a new stage.

How will the proceeding continue and what comes next

The next step in the court proceedings in this infringement proceeding will be the adoption of advocate general’s opinion, in which a preliminary legal position will be rendered to the Court. This is not binding on the Court in the case, but in almost all cases the subsequent judicial decision is in sync with that. The advocate general’s opinion is to be rendered during the next few months, and it is possible that the Court’s judgment will be rendered during the first half of 2025.

It is most likely that the Court will condemn the contested Hungarian legislation, but the interesting part will be what the Court will do with arguments based on the violation of Article 2 TEU – is that violation going to constitute an infringement by itself, or will the Court follow the more careful argument of the Commission’s application? In the first case, it will set a precedent with currently uncalculatable effect.

You can watch the broadcast of the hearing online here. The original post is available at the C4EP website.

Orbán új frontot nyit, ezúttal a Nemzetközi Büntetőbírósággal szemben?

Amikor a múlt héten a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság kiadta a letartóztatási parancsot többek között Benjamin Netanjahu izraeli miniszterelnökkel szemben, lehetett rá számítani, hogy az vet majd hullámokat.

Rögtön aznap, csütörtökön beszéltem a Hit Rádiónak abban a témában, hogy a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság letartóztatási parancsából mi minden következik:

Mondtam többek között, kérdésre, hogy nem lehet annyira hülye a magyar kormány, hogy provokatív módon lépjen fel, és mondjuk már csak dacból, igazi hülyegyerek módjára Orbán Viktor meghívja Magyarországra Netanjahut.

Mire az anyag másnap kikerült a YouTube-ra, már rögtön hívott az ATV Híradó egy gyors interjúra, hogy Orbán a szokásos péntek reggeli vizenjárásán bejelentette, hogy még aznap meghívja Netanjahut. Remekjó. Inkább itt most nem írom le, hogy mi volt az első reakcióm.

A témát ezek után újra érintettük hétfő reggel a Klubrádión, illetve a Heti TV-n:

Röviden összefoglalva: ez nem lesz jó.

Nem csak az a jogi gond jelentkezik, amit Putyin kapcsán is rendesen körbejárkáltunk már úgy tavaly március magasságában, hanem az, hogy ennek Magyarországra nézve bajosan látszik bármi haszna, ellenben gond lehet belőle dúsan. Orbán Viktor és Magyarország nem engedheti meg magának azt a konfrontatív magatartást, amit annak idején Trumpnak sikerült kimaxolnia a Nemzetközi Büntetőbírósággal szemben (erről lásd egy akkori podcast felvételemet)…

Az Európai Parlament jóváhagyta Várhelyi Olivér jelölését?

A címben jelzett kérdést jártuk körül tegnap reggel az ATV-n. Mindenképpen szükséges egy pontosítás: még nem tudjuk, hogy jóhagyta-e, hiszen az Európa Parlament plenáris ülése a Bizottság egészéről majd a következő héten fog szavazni, de az illetékes bizottság elfogadó döntése arra utal, hogy az átfogó támogatással sem lesz gond.

A döntés nem meglepő, korábban számos helyen és alkalommal elmondtam, hogy miért ez a döntés várható a problémás előjelek ellenére:

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Kiből lehet majd legfőbb ügyész?

Az Alaptörvény tervezett változtatása szerint a legfőbb ügyésznek nem kell ügyésznek lennie. Remélem, az emiatti felháborodás hangadói között nem lesznek vezető szereplők azok, akik nem is olyan régen még az állatorvos Hadházy Ákost követelték erre a posztra…

Az én állításom a témában egyszerű (és semmi új, mert mindig is ezt mondtam): amíg az OGY választja a legfőbb ügyészt, lehessen bárki. Ha ragaszkodunk hozzá, hogy ügyész legyen, akkor válassza ki az ügyészi testület, és nevezze ki ennek alapján az igazságügyi miniszter. De ne ragaszkodjunk. Felejtsük már el ezt a “független” legfőbb ügyészség marhaságot…

A jelenlegi helyzet viszont egyszerűen kimaxolása a képmutatásnak. Egy politikai eljárástól várunk egy nem politikai megoldást. Ne már… Ez a Fidesztől teljesen függetlenül is értelmetlen, azzal együtt meg pláne.

Lásd ezt az elemzésemet három és fél évvel ezelőttről.

Bejegyzések a legfőbb ügyész témájában:

Beszélgetés alkotmányos témában

Elérhető lett a YouTube-on a KlikkTV Rostrum című műsorának legújabb, nyolcadik adása, amiben Szentpéteri Nagy Richard társaságában arról beszélgettünk, lehet-e még valaha valódi alkotmányozás Magyarországon. Külön örömömre kitértünk a történeti alkotmány kérdésére, és körbejártuk,…

Kiből lehet majd legfőbb ügyész?

Az Alaptörvény tervezett változtatása szerint a legfőbb ügyésznek nem kell ügyésznek lennie. Remélem, az emiatti felháborodás hangadói között nem lesznek vezető szereplők azok, akik nem is olyan régen még az állatorvos Hadházy Ákost követelték…

A legfőbb ügyész közvetlen választásáról

Istenem, egy újabb veretes baromság az ötletbörzében. A bírókat nem akarjuk esetleg közvetlenül választani? De most komolyan. Csupán amiatt a tragikus tény miatt, hogy a Fidesz maffiásította az ügyészséget és Polt leghűbb ügyész úr…

The confirmation process of the European Commission – new analysis

My recent analysis titled “The confirmation process of the European Commission – power of the European populus via its electorate over „Brussels bureaucrats”?” is available on the C4EP website.

Read it here!

Additionally, me and my colleagues have started to make analyses on the candidates for the new European Commission paralel to the confirmation process. Find those as well there, if You are interested.

Várhelyi Olivér 2024-es biztos-jelölti meghallgatásáról

Ma reggel a Heti Tv-n beszéltünk Várhelyi Olivér uniós biztosjelölti meghallgatásáról, amire a múlt héten került sor. A beszélgetés itt megnézhető:

Ahogy elhangzott, a meghallgatás viszonylag simán ment, és bár a jelölt kapott pótkérdéseket, nem jelenthetjük ki, hogy a jelölt megbukott volna. Továbbra sem tekinthető biztosnak a befutása, de a sokak által várt-remélt tűzijáték elmaradt.

Nemsokára elérhető lesz egy (angol nyelvű) átfogóbb elemzésem, amiben az egész parlamenti, megerősítési eljárásról, és a jelenlegi helyzetről készítettem a napokban.

Korábbi bejegyzéseim Várhelyi Olivér korábbi, 2019-es meghallgatásairól:

Várhelyi Olivér biztos-jelölti meghallgatásáról

“Összességében megállapíthatjuk, hogy amilyen unalmas volt maga a meghallgatás, most láthattuk az eddig messze legjobban felkészült biztos-jelöltet, és ez teljesen független attól, hogy amúgy mit gondolunk a magyar kormányról, vagy annak EU-politikájáról. A kérdés…

Szexbotrány a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróságon?

Megjelent a magyar sajtóban is a hír, amely szerint alakul egy zaklatási botrány a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróságon. Ezzel kapcsolatban több kérdés is felmerült bennem. Az első, hogy vajon eljutunk-e valaha oda, hogy nem fogja a hazai sajtó összekeverni a Nemzetközi Bíróságot (aminek nyilván NINCS semmilyen ügyésze, “fő” pedig pláne) a Nemzetközi Büntetőbírósággal (ICC – International Criminal Court), amiről amúgy szó van? A második, hogy különösen ciki, hogy a tudósítás szerint a külügyi szóvivőnek is sikerült ugyanezt előadnia…

Amúgy az ügy elég ideje a nyilvánosság előtt van, abban két hete már a bíróság is kommunikált, a belső vizsgálat folyamatban van. Érdekessége a helyzetnek, hogy az áldozat a hírek szerint nemhogy névtelenséget kér, de nem is ő indította meg az eljárást, és ő maga is erősen bizonytalan abban, hogy akarja-e az egészet. Egyvalami biztos, ilyen még nem volt, de személy szerint nekem nagyon nem fájna, ha Khan ebbe belebukna (kritizáltam őt korábban itt is eleget, finoman), de a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróságra gyakorolt hatása az ügynek lehet igencsak romboló.

Annyit szeretnék rögzíteni, hogy személy szerint nem osztom azokat a lebegtetett véleményeket, hogy ennek a helyzetnek bármi konkrét köze lenne az izraeli állami vezetőkkel szembeni vizsgálatok megindításához, bár természetesen nem zárható ki, hogy van-e valamiféle zavarkeltő művelet a háttérben, de az biztos, hogy a megindult vizsgálatokat az érdemben nem tudja befolyásolni. A magyar kormány a fent hivatkozott cikkben említett levele érdemben semmit nem jelent, az egy lágyabb állásfoglalásnak tekinthető a magyar-izraeli bilaterális kapcsolatok jelenlegi szintje mentén.

Milyen hatása lehet ennek a botránynak? Röviden: a legrosszabb esetben a főügyész lemondása/lemondatása a szervezetben részes államok részéről. A részes államok gyűlése jelenleg napirenden tartja a kérdést, ebből az következik, hogy még minden lehetőség nyitott, és nincs kétségem, hogy az államok mindenképpen megpróbálják megvédeni majd a Nemzetközi Büntetőbíróság tekintélyét. De ez még előttünk van…

A choice not for, but affecting Europe – whom for POTUS, Harris or Trump?

My analysis on the possible implications of the result of the upcoming US presidential elections is published on the website of the Centre for European Progression (C4EP).

If You are interested, click here to read it!